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Module 2

Upping The Ante
Thomas Power
Lecturer Economics and Financial Management
College of Engineering and the Built Environment
Dublin Institute of Technology
thomas.power@dit.ie

The aim of this essay is to present the inherent barriers to the achievement of full cooperative solutions to global environmental problems. It reviews the literature of
Swanson, Barrett, Pearse and Helme to explain the problems associated with
multilateral bargaining and to compare two types of bargaining, namely “ex-post”
and “ex-ante”. It attempts to apply the theoretical guidelines on multilateral
bargaining to GATT.

PREFACE:
The classic "Problem of the Commons" is associated with resources to which no
property rights have been assigned. These recourses are free to all who wish to avail
of them. Human nature being what it is, such resources will be overused. This will
ultimately threaten their existence if they are finite. However, because of their nature
agreement on the management of open-access resources is extremely unlikely.
Because agreement on restraint by some users releases proportionately higher
quantities of the "free" resource for use by non-agreeing parties, the latter will have an
incentive to opportunism i.e. they will "free-ride". Full co-operation becomes
impossible in such a scenario except by outside intervention (government regulation,
the courts). But what of the "global commons"? No international government exists
to manage such resources as the environment, fish stocks in "open access" waters etc.
The only alternative is to fashion agreements so as to ensure full co-operation by all
the parties. This, as we shall see, is no easy task.
Finally "ex-ante" bargaining refers to a process which leads to simultaneous
implementation of an agreement by all parties. "Ex-post" bargaining arises when
some parties defer agreement to a later date. (Pearse and Helme 1991).
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Inherent Difficulties of Multilateral Bargaining:
The general framework within which international law is instituted is as follows: An
multilateral conference is held from which an agreed text emerges. This text,
technically known as a "convention" becomes law on ratification by a specified
minimum number of countries. The convention remains open for signature by initially
non-ratifying parties. This introduces a problematical feature into multilateral
bargaining that of sequential accession, all parties are not simultaneously bound by
the convention. This leads to "ex-post" bargaining which, in the area of natural
resources, theoretically means that although many countries may bind themselves to
conservation, the overall effect on resource may not be diminished (or may be only
partially diminished). Thus the benefits of agreement to the acceding parties are
nullified or eroded. Conversely the costs of eventual agreement to non-acceding
parties will be increased because they will then be giving up a greater share of the
resource than would have been the case if they had been party to the original
convention. Effectively voluntary acceptance of constraints by some merely confers
on others the right to appropriate a greater share of the resource. (Swanson 1991).
For Swanson, the logic of the foregoing is that the first best option for any country is
unrestricted maximisation while others accept constraints. Individual incentives exist
which only serve to drive the parties away from agreement. This leads to the
possibility of "free riding". The more countries sign the convention the greater is the
temptation to "free ride" because each successive acceptance increases the potential
share of the resource for non-acceptors. The optimal benefits would be conferred on
the last country to sign. We may well wonder why, given the foregoing, any country
would voluntarily sign a convention. The fact remains that they do for reasons
ventured by Swanson (Helm and Pearce, 1991).
Helm and Pearse (1991) considered the problem of states holding out by "free riding"
as a result of the combination of open access resources and the sequential nature of
acceptance of international conventions. There exists another cause of holdouts (not
entirely separable from the first), namely "heterogeneous parties". In essence,
because all states are not uniformly affected by decisions on resources (for instance,
in the case of acid rain, states upwind of emissions have less to gain from reductions
than downwind or peripheral states or the denial of full access to a resource may be a
greater burden on some countries due to a lack of substitutes) any attempt to obtain
agreement on uniform standards will fail.
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Comparison Between "Ex-Post" and "Ex-Ante" bargaining:
Historically sequential accessions to international conventions has been the norm.
Early ratification by a majority of countries has led to the creation of "customary law"
(i.e. the accepted practice for those countries) which can exert moral pressure on
dissenting countries but lacks real teeth. Some of the weaknesses of the "ex-post"
bargaining occasioned by sequential accessions and discussed in Helm and Pearse
may be enumerated.
(1)
Delayed full implementation of action on resources leads to irretrievable loss
of that portion of the resource which is used up by "free riders" in the interim. In the
extreme there may be extinction of the resource. Both effects have dire implications
for future generations.
(2)
"Agreed" laws become subject to unilateral restructuring either by way of
reservation/derogation (explicit disagreement) or by tacit disagreement, whereby an
apparently consenting country unilaterally ignores the provisions of the contract. This
leads to the common perception of international laws as being ineffective.
(3)
Conventions are often more formal than substantial. To achieve nominal
"consensus" the text is often imprecise to accommodate the viewpoints of the various
parties. Such conventions may degenerate into mere aspirations leading to wholesale
breakdown in implementation. This further discredits international law. (Helme and
Pearce 1991).
In sum the spectre of holdout (via "free riding" or heterogeneity ) haunts all sequential
accessions.
"Ex -Ante" bargaining - Why it has failed.
According to Swanson (1991) binding enforceable "ex-ante" agreements require the
following components:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

An effective monitoring system;
Objective optimal usage level;
Sanctions to deter non-compliance;
Meaningful share allocations.
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(i)
Monitoring:
Parties to the agreement need to be assured that they are getting their full benefits.
This can only be achieved by being able to verify that all others are complying. Selfimplementation will not satisfy this requirement. Even if carried out scrupulously,
there is no observable return to the participating countries. The only satisfactory
solution is the institution of an independent international monitoring agency. This
should be done "ex-ante" as part of the convention.
(ii)
Optimal Usage Level:
Independent scientific opinions on aggregate optimal usage of the resource should be
accepted "ex-ante" The tendency is for greater users of the resource to produce their
own "scientific" evidence of acceptable aggregate usage because their pro-rata
allocation will increase with any increase in total usage. This leads to less benefits to
others due to the depletion of the resource.
(iii) Sanctions:
As there is no global authority to enforce agreements such as exist in individual
countries (e.g. judiciary and police) enforcement must form part of the convention.
Agreement on methods of enforcement is not enough on its own, performance
thereafter must be provided for. This can be done by allocating meaningful shares,
setting a time frame for the implementation of such allocations, and crucially,
instituting a bond system to guarantee enforcement. If this is not achieved in "ex-ante'
bargaining, the dynamics of changing conditions will cause contracting countries to
alter their perceptions of the original distribution of shares and will lead ultimately to
the collapse of the agreement. (Swanson 1991).
(iv) Realistic Shares:
Uniform shares: Equal access for all to open access global resources appeals to a
sense of fairness. However as all countries are not equal this approach will merely
institutionalise the disparity between rich and poor. As there is no international
representative forum, the interests of the weaker parties cannot be protected, as is the
case in democracies where the political process simplifies the relationships between
heterogeneous groups through a representative system. (Swanson 1991).
Non-uniform shares: The allocation of meaningful shares in global multilateral
bargaining is extremely complex. To overcome the problem of handouts highly
technical formulae are required to differentiate between individual countries' burdens
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(which are not uniformly distributed due to heterogeneity) and the benefits conferred
on them by "free riding". Countries have incentives to distort information on the
effects of agreement on them. Until this problem is solved "ex-ante" bargaining will
fail. (Swanson 1991).
Scientific measurement of meaningful shares:
Scientific committees with
representative appointments and majority voting are seen as a possibility of
introducing elements of representative government at international level.
Allocation by prior appropriation: A baseline date is established. Countries are then
allocated shares based on their usage of the resource on that date. Again this would
institutionalise the gap between developed and developing countries and would
accordingly fail.
Swanson concludes that "ex-ante" bargaining is preferable to "ex-post" bargaining
because while both involve high costs, the benefits from the former are available at an
earlier date. This is significant when considering environmental resources. The
longer the delay the more of the environmental "cake" is eaten. The eaten portion is
foregone forever and future generations suffer from this loss.
(iii)

GATT as an Example of "Ex-Ante" Bargaining.

The purpose of the W.T.O (and previously GATT) is to reduce unfair competition by,
inter alia, ensuring international parity of tariffs and controlling of "dumping" of low
cost goods. Any application or reduction in tariffs by any group of countries must be
reciprocated by all countries. In theory this is equal treatment for all. This would be
fine if all contracting countries were equal, but this is patently not so. Developing
countries lack the bargaining power of the developed countries, because the former's
products lack the range and complexity of the latter's. While imports of raw materials
into the developed world are subject to low tariffs (2% for Malaysian palm oil into the
E.C.), the tariffs on value-added products are prohibitively high (25% on margarine
from Malaysia). Thus developed countries are assured of a permanent supply of raw
materials at the expense of the poorer countries (only 9% of the market price of
timber products goes to Third World Countries suppliers).
Furthermore, the final intention of GATT, subject to agreement, is the institution of a
Multilateral Trade Organisation (MTO) which will subsume GATT rules and will
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have wide powers of enforcement including the power to over-ride national
legislation which is inconsistent with former GATT rules.
GATT and MTO contain within them many of the elements which Swanson would
consider desirable for successful contracts based on "ex-ante" bargaining i.e.
universally binding, proper monitoring by way of reciprocal actions, the ultimate
sanction of MTO intervention. Nonetheless one is left to ponder the wisdom of Third
World parties to GATT in agreeing to a convention that is so obviously biased against
them. Allocation of shares of the economic "cake" have been based on the principle
of prior appropriation which should have militated against its acceptance by countries
which were poorer to start with. Any possibility of "ex-post" bargaining to improve
their lot is precluded by the provision for reciprocal action by others to maintain the
tariff status quo. Could it be that Swanson has overlooked a vital ingredient of all
"ex-ante" bargaining, the relevant strengths (economic or even military) of the
bargaining parties?
SUMMARY:
Examples abound in several areas of international agreement of the barriers to the
attainment of full international co-operation. In the light of
what Swanson has to say about "free riding" Ireland's neutrality takes on an aspect of
virtuosity rather than virtuousness! Although not party to military conventions for
mutual defence, we nevertheless enjoy de facto benefits of protection by virtue of our
membership of the E.C. Qualifications, by way of derogations abound in EC law thus
diluting the full co-operation ideal. Historically we have seen the ultimate in "free
riding" when several countries opted for neutrality at the outset of World War 2 only
to declare war on Germany when that country was obviously facing defeat. Thus they
hoped to share in the benefits of victory while avoiding the costs of participation. At
the micro-level the current peace process can be seen as analogous to sequential
accession. The peace process has been instituted by the Downing Street Declaration
(an implicitly multilateral convention). It has been left open to Sinn Fein to "ratify"
this convention by persuading the IRA to forego violence. Benefits will then become
available to Sinn Fein in the form of a possible allocation of shares in the political
process. It would seem that Sinn Fein perceive themselves as benefiting politically
at the expense of others by postponing acceptance of the terms of the agreement.
Because simultaneous acceptance of the Declaration was not politically possible, Sinn
Fein have been given the opportunity to become "free riders" by gaining benefits now
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and holding out for even greater benefits in "ex-post" bargaining (which is effectively
going on at present).
Multilateral bargaining is bedevilled by the complexity of motives and by technical
difficulties. Incentives always exist which drive parties away from a full co-operative
solution to global problems. To change the orientation of incentives is the greatest
difficulty associated with any effort to solve the world's environmental problems.
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